












EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE IN MOBILE 















A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 





M.Com (Economic Development) Minor Dissertation 
University of Cape Town 
Faculty of Commerce 
School of Economics 





The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
















I am grateful to the MasterCard Foundation for sponsoring my master’s programme. I also 
thank my supervisor A/Prof. Lukasz Grzybowski for the support and effort he put into my 
work, and helping me to develop academically. Many thanks to everyone who contributed 










The mobile telecommunications industry continues to be at the epicentre for growth, 
innovation, and disruption for virtually all other industries. It is one of the keys to sustainable 
economic development especially in developing and emerging economies. Over the past two 
decades, the industry has been very dynamic, experiencing high growth rates. This paper uses 
econometric models to investigate the impact of market structure on market outcomes such as 
mobile prices and investment in emerging economies. This is done using quarterly panel data 
on fifteen emerging economies across four continents for the period between 2006 and 2015. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the number of operators are used to proxy market 
structure and effective price per minute paid by consumers and capital expenditure per 
subscriber are used to proxy mobile prices and investment respectively. Empirical results 
indicate that increase in market concentration increases market prices. Results also indicate an 
inverted-U relationship between market concentration and investment. These results indicate 
that there is a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency which means that competition 
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The mobile telecommunications industry continues to experience rapid growth. The industry 
registered a total of 3.6 billion unique mobile subscribers by the end of 2014 which accounted 
for approximately fifty percent of the world’s population up from twenty percent ten years ago 
(GSMA, 2015). In addition to this, as at 2014, the GSMA (2015) estimates show that there 
were 7.1 billion global SIM and 243 million machine-to-machine (M2M) connections. The 
global mobile subscriber base increased by about 5% in 2014 with developed markets growing 
more slowly than developing and emerging economies as penetration rates approach saturation 
levels (GSMA, 2015). For instance, Europe and North America recorded unique subscriber 
growth below one percent in 2014 whereas sub-Saharan Africa which still remains under-
penetrated recorded subscriber growth of about twelve percent (GSMA, 2015). 
 
Emerging markets have witnessed the growth in the number of mobile subscriptions from 
around 500 million in 2002 to around 5 billion in 2013 (Edwards, 2014). Mobile operators’ 
valuations have followed the same trend. Nonetheless, the building of mobile phone networks 
has created a large amount of value over the last 10 years. In many emerging markets, mobile 
industry is highly fragmented with some countries having five or more players with a market 
share of at least five percent (Edwards, 2014; GSMA, 2015). 
 
The mobile telecommunications industry is a major driver of global economic growth and 
development as well as welfare. Investments in mobile telecommunications infrastructure is 
likely to provide a short-term boost to the economy and create a foundation for a long-term 
growth and employment perspectives. For instance, the mobile telecommunications industry 
generated 3.8% of global gross domestic product in 2014, which is equivalent to over 3 trillion 
US dollars of economic value across 236 countries (GSMA, 2015). Moreover, research 
findings indicate that mobile telecommunications industry investment impact go beyond the 
scope of the industry itself to explain up to one third of the economic growth by promoting 
growth in adjacent industries and creating new industries (Wieck & Vidal, 2011). 
 
This paper looks at the effect of market structure on prices and investment decisions in mobile 
industry in emerging economies. Due to lack of reliable data on prices and investments, there 
is only scarce literature on this subject. This analysis is made possible by use of empirical 
approach by looking at quarterly data for the period between 2006 and 2015 for fifteen 
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emerging economies. A challenge in collecting a large panel dataset like this is to find relevant 
and comparable information across countries and over time. However, the  dataset  spans  a  
time period long enough to capture changes in market structure that provide variation in the 
data to assess in a multivariate setting how market structure impacts  on  prices and investments. 
 
Particularly, this paper focuses on how competition influences mobile service prices and 
investment decisions. In the literature, competition, for which there is no direct measure, is 
commonly approximated by market structure, which on the other hand is approximated by 
market concentration indexes. This study follows this practice. The Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is the usual proxy for market structure and hence competition. Number of 
operators is used as an alternative measure of market structure. Empirical results indicate that 
increase in market concentration increases market prices. Results also indicate an inverted-U 
relationship between market concentration and investment. However, number of competitors 
in the market is found to have no significant effect on both prices and investment.  These results 
indicate that there is a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Competition in mobile 
telecommunications reduces prices but also results in lower investments as compared to more 
concentrated markets. 
 
This paper follows the approach used by Genakos, Valletti and Verboven (2015) in their paper 
on mobile consolidation in mobile industry. They examine the effects of market structure on 
prices and investment in thirty three OECD countries in what they refer to as the first 
economically and statistically relevant assessment on dual impact market structure on prices 
and investment in mobile telecommunication. In their assessment, they use operator level end 
user prices, capital expenditure as a proxy for investment, mobile termination rates as 
instrumental variable and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as proxy for market 
concentration. However, their study uses data on OECD countries, while this paper 
concentrates on fifteen emerging economies across four continents. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first paper which investigates the effects of market structure on prices 
and investments in mobile telecommunications industry in emerging economies.  
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 relates this work to the existing literature. 
Section 3 describes data and provides information on market trends for the main variables. 
Section 4 illustrates the empirical framework followed to identify the causal relationship 
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between market structure, prices, and investments. Section 5 presents the main results and a 
discussion based on the results and finally section 6 concludes. 
 
1.1 Mobile Telecommunications Industry Overview 
The global mobile telecommunication industry has over seven billion users generating annual 
service revenue of over 960 billion US dollars. Most of this revenue is generated from 
traditional calls and texts (Vodafone, 2014). However, the industry has witnessed acceleration 
in the demand in the past few years and by 2014, around 28% of mobile revenue was from data 
usage, up from 13% in 2009. Vodafone (2014) estimates that emerging markets account for 
around 74 % of the global mobile subscription. Majority of the mobile subscribers are in 
regions such as Africa and Asia, indicating the effect of combination of large populations and 
poor fixed line infrastructure development especially in rural areas where there are lower 
income levels and less network coverage. However, these countries have lower mobile 
penetration rates compared to developed countries. 
 
There has been strong growth in demand for mobile services. For instance, the global annual 
growth of mobile users was approximately 9% per year between 2010 and 2013 with global 
mobile penetration increasing from 69% to 98% between 2009 and 2013 (Vodafone, 2013). 
Most of the increase in mobile subscriptions has been from emerging economies due to 
favourable growth drivers such as young and expanding populations, low fixed line 
infrastructure penetration, low but rising mobile penetration rates, and faster economic growth. 
Other factors include better mobile networks and growth in data demand driven by increasing 
smartphone and tablet penetration (Vodafone, 2013).  
 
By the end of 2014, unique mobile subscriber penetration in developed economies stood at 79% 
which shows that it is approaching saturation (GSMA, 2015). In addition, there has been a shift 
in technology from 2G to mobile broadband networks across the world with mobile broadband 
connections. This has led to acceleration in adoption of 3G and 4G technologies which 
accounted for about 40% of total connections at the end of 2014. While 2G still remains the 
dominant network technology globally today, there also been a considerable decline in 
investment in the technology (GSMA, 2015). For instance, 2G network connections accounted 
for 90% of the total connections in 2008 which dropped to around 60% by 2014. In absolute 
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terms, the number of 2G network connections peaked in 2013 and fell by 6% in 2014 (GSMA, 
2015). 
 
The mobile telecommunications industry is highly competitive with at least three to four 
mobile network operators in each country. There are also alternative mobile service providers 
which include mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and internet-based companies as 
well as software providers that offer alternative communication services hence this gives 
customers a wide range of mobile service providers to choose from. The industry is regulated 
and monitored by mostly independent regulators. Entry is regulated through licencing and 
regulator have to approve corporate actions such as mergers and acquisitions. Regulators 
continue to lower mobile termination rates (MTRs) and to limit the amount that operators can 
charge for mobile roaming services.  
 
The mobile telecommunications markets are characterised by dynamic features. First, the 
industry experiences high pace of technological changes with short innovation cycles. These 
innovations include innovations on network, product and service differentiation and quality 
improvement. Secondly, the market is highly capital intensive. This has led to emergency of 
mobile virtual network operators which benefit from infrastructure sharing. The last 
characteristic is the economies of scale. Mobile telecommunications markets have few mobile 
network operators serving large number of subscribers making the markets oligopoly.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
This paper draws literature from different streams of literature including: (i) studies on dual 
impact of market structure on prices and investment in mobile industry (Genakos, Valletti and 
Verboven, 2015); (ii) studies on the relationship between market concentration and prices 
(Singh and Zhu, 2008; Beckert and Mazzarott, 2010; Yan, 2013; Seim and Viard, 2011); and 
(iii) studies on the relationship between market concentration and investment (Alesina et al., 
2005; Mackay and Akdogu, 2008; Ruiz-Porras and Lopez-Mateo, 2010; Grajek and Roller, 




2.1 Effect of Market Structure on Prices 
Over the past decades, research that examines the relationship between market structure and 
prices has replaced studies that look at profit concentration.  An advantage of using prices as 
opposed to profits is that they are not subject to accounting conventions, and they may be easier 
to obtain, often at a more detailed level of individual products sold by the firms (Genakos et 
al., 2015). Weiss (1989) provides a collection of a large number of price-concentration studies 
and argues that, since prices are determined in the market, they are not subject to Demsetz’s 
critique1 . Moreover, the majority of the price-concentration studies use data across local 
markets within an industry, rather than across industries, which makes the comparisons easier 
(Genakos et al., 2015). 
 
Economic theories on effects of competition on prices suggest that prices decline with an 
increase in competition (Singh and Zhu, 2008; Beckert and Mazzarott, 2010; Yan, 2013; Seim 
and Viard, 2011). For instance, Singh and Zhu (2008) used cross-sectional data on car rentals 
at the US airports and found prices in monopoly and duopoly markets are approximately thirty 
percent higher than in competitive markets with seven or eight firms. Their findings were 
supported by Beckert and Mazzarotto (2010) who found that higher numbers of cinema firms 
on average induce lower prices using data from the UK. Yan (2013) in his doctoral thesis on 
competition and price determination in diverse markets also suggests that prices drop quickly 
as the number of firms increase using data on US retail gasoline markets from 2006 to 2009. 
 
In research which is more specific to mobile communications, Seim and Viard (2011) study 
the effect of market structure on cellular technology adoption and pricing. They found that 
entry induces firms to offer a greater number of tariffs with more evenly distributed plans. 
Entry leads to decline of prices, particularly for high-valuation consumers who benefit from 
steeper quantity discounts. In a more recent paper, Genakos, Valletti and Verboven (2015), use 
telecommunications panel data from thirty three OECD countries for the period 2004-2014 and 
find that a 10% increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is used as a proxy for 
market concentration, on average increases mobile prices by 20%. They also find that 
increasing market concentration by four-to-three symmetric merger increase mobile prices by 
16.3% when compared with a situation in which no merger. On the number of competitors, 
                                                          
11 Demsetz’s quality critique: High concentrated market structure is linked to higher service levels, which as a 
result, are linked to higher prices 
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they find that one more competitor reduces mobile prices by 8.6%. However, mobile prices 
decrease by 15.9% more for an entry in a market with four operators compared with a market 
with two or three operators. 
 
2.2 Effects of Market Structure on Investment 
Economic theories on effects of competition on investment are vague. The Schumpeterian 
theory suggests that there may be greater incentives to invest and innovate if operators can 
maintain the resulting returns in a concentrated market (Elixmann et al, 2015). One the other 
hand, another economic theory suggests that there is investment stimulation in competitive 
markets as operators seek to leapfrog each other in order to gain competitive advantage 
(Mackay and Akdogu, 2008; Ruiz-Porras and Lopez-Mateo, 2010).  
 
For instance, a report by HSBC (2015) claims to have found an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between investment and competition, in which the optimal level of competition is found to 
correspond to an EBITDA margin of 38% while Frontier for the GSMA (2015) study suggests 
that the level of competition measured through a number of operators does not have a clear 
influence on investment proxied by capex per subscriber. A further perspective combining both 
theories is that there is ‘turning point’ (inverted U-shaped curve) within which it is possible to 
identify an ‘optimal’ level of competition in order to spur investment (Elixmann et al, 2015). 
Aghion et al. (2005) suggest that competition discourages innovation by laggard firms but 
encourages neck-to-neck firms to innovate. They argue that competition reduces post-entry 
rents and hence reduces the equilibrium number of entrants. 
 
The econometric assessments by Alesina et al. (2005), Mackay and Akdogu (2008), Ruiz-
Porras and Lopez-Mateo (2010) and Grajek and Roller (2012) supports the findings by HSBC 
(2015) which links between market structure and investments. For instance, Alesina et al. (2005) 
studied the role that overall regulation, barriers to entry and public ownership play in 
investment for many non-manufacturing industries such energy, transports and communication 
in OECD countries. They used econometric models on economic data such as investment, 
capital stock and value added for 175 non-manufacturing industries in 21 OECD countries. 
They found that increasing regulation increases the cost of entry and the penalty of expanding 
production which results in less investment while competition-enhancing policies do promote 
investment. Grajek and Roller (2012) supports Alesina et al (2005) through their econometric 
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assessment on regulation on fixed-line operators in 20 countries between 1997 and 2006. They 
argue that regulation undermines incentive to invest both at industry and operator level.  
 
Firms in monopolistic markets exhibit lower investment sensitivity and are slower to invest 
than firms in competitive markets as found by Mackay and Akdogu (2008). Using Tobin on 
data from manufacturing industries in United States of America between 1981 and 2000, they 
found that investment in monopolistic industries is half sensitive to changes compared to 
investments in competitive industries. This means that firms in high concentrated markets 
exhibit lower investment sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in low concentrated 
markets. However, investment sensitivity and investment speed are highest in mid-
concentrated markets which also experience less entry and exit than other industries. In another 
paper, Ruiz-Porras and Lopez-Mateo (2010) suggest that the effect of market concentration on 
investment is felt more in medium and large firms based on empirical analysis of 182 
manufacturing industries in Mexico. They however concluded that competition may promote 
investment. 
 
In a work related to telecommunications, a study by Elixmann et al. (2015) supports the idea 
that there is no linkage between consolidation in mobile markets and an increase in investments. 
They used econometric analysis to study the effect of consolidation on investment in mobile 
telecommunication in eight European countries and four non-European countries. Using 
investment, profitability and market concentration data, they found no evidence to suggest that 
there is a linkage between higher market concentration and investment in mobile industry. 
However, their analysis suggests that investment levels in mobile markets may depend on a 
range of factors, which might include demand factors such as mobile video usage, cost drivers 
such as a high rural population or potentially auction dates and coverage obligations. For 
instance, investment in the UK is lower than in the US, while the extent of concentration as 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is similar in both countries. Possible factors that 
could explain the higher investment in the US are earlier assignment of 4G spectrum, higher 
network deployment costs and higher demand for video services. 
 
In a paper more closely related to this one, Genakos et al. (2015) find that an increase in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by 10 % on average increases operator investment by 24.1% in 
OECD markets.  On the other hand, they find that an extra competitor increases operator 
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investment by approximately 10.7%.  However, they find that investment per operator is lower 
by 18.3% in markets with four operators compared with markets with two or three operators 
and 25.3% lower in markets with five or more operators. A four-to-three merger would increase 
operator investment by 19.3%. They concluded that increase in market concentration generates 
a trade-off effect: increase in prices and increase in investment. 
 
The best of my knowledge, there is no literature on the impact of market structure on prices 
and investments in the mobile telecommunications industry in emerging economies. This paper 
fills the gap by collecting and analysing a unique data on prices and investment in mobile 
telecommunication industry in fifteen emerging economies for the period between Q1 2006 
and Q4 2015. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
This section outlines theoretical model which relates to this study and follows Davis & Garces 
(2010). The Economic theory predicts that market structure affects prices. Under general 
conditions, a reduction of the number of firms results in an increase in market prices.  
 
Consider a Cournot model in which firms that entered the market compete in quantities of a 
homogeneous good. In such oligopolistic market, exit reduces the number of firms so that total 
market output tends to be reduced and at the same time it increases the amount that any 
incumbent firm will produce due to the shape of each individual firm’s equilibrium supply 
function. The net effect on total output, and hence prices, is therefore potentially ambiguous 
(Davis & Garces, 2010). It depends on the relative effect of an increase in firm output and a 
decrease in the number of firms. In that case, price will rise following the exit of an incumbent 
firm and fall following entry of a new player. 
Let aggregate market demand be given by: 
𝑄 = 𝑆(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝), 
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For the firm to break even, at least  𝜋𝑖 = 0 is needed. The corresponding equilibrium number 
of firms is solved to obtain the following; 




The number of firms is therefore concave in market size S. The Cournot equilibrium derived 
above is special in that, to make the algebra simple, constant marginal costs are assumed. 
 
Market structure is determined by the number of firms in a market. The number of firms is 
determined by entry or exit decisions of firms. These decisions are driven by expectations of 
future profits which as well as the nature of competition within the market. This paper 
investigates how competition affects prices and investment in mobile telecommunication 




3. Data Description and Market Trends  
3.1 Data Description 
This paper uses quarterly panel data from fifteen emerging economies over the period from 
first quarter of 2006 to last quarter of 2015.  It combines data on prices paid by end users of 
mobile services per minute, operators’ market shares, investments and revenues. It also uses 
information on the time when an independent telecommunications regulator was established in 
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a country.  The data comes mainly from Ovum2 as well as other sources such as International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
3.1.1 Prices 
Effective price per minute (EPPM) is used as a proxy for market price paid by end consumers. 
Ovum reports operator and country level quarterly information on the effective price per 
minute. It collects information on Minutes of Use (MOU) and Average Revenue per User 
(ARPU) data from mobile operators for both voice and data which are used to derive effective 
price per minute by dividing ARPU with MOU. This metric is obtained for all operators in the 
countries of the interest for the period between quarter Q12006 and quarter Q42015 and 
averaged. The information is provided in US dollars using market exchange rate. The quarterly 
average rate is used to remove the effect of exchange rate fluctuations. However, it is not clear 
whether some countries include non-service revenues in calculation of ARPU. Thus, the data 
should be interpreted with caution since there might be inconsistency of values across countries 
and operators. 
  
In addition, the ARPU is also analysed since it is frequently discussed in policy debates. This 
metric represents the average revenue generated per subscription. The term is typically derived 
by dividing the revenue generated in a specific period and dividing this by the average 
subscription base of the operator during this same period. ARPU is reported as the average 
monthly amount generated per subscription during each quarter. 
3.1.2 Investments and Profits 
This paper uses operators’ capital expenditure per subscriber as a proxy for investment. Capital 
expenditure is incurred when the operator spends money either to acquire fixed assets 
(investment) or to add to the value of an existing fixed asset with a useful life that extends 
beyond the taxable year (maintenance CAPEX) (Ovum, 2016). The index is obtained from 
Ovum as reported by the operator. There are however many missing observations on the 
operator level data and hence country level data is used, which are recomputed as follows; it is 
assumed that the operator capital investment is proportionate to its market share. Therefore, 
the total market investment at the country level is obtained by extrapolating capital 
                                                          
2 Ovum is part of the Informa Group, one of the world’s leading provider of business intelligence services. 




expenditures for operators with missing data based on market shares and capital expenditures 
for operators with non-missing data. Next, capital expenditure for each operator is divided by 
its subscriber base at a specific period to obtain capital expenditure per subscriber then 
averaged to get the country level average.  
 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), which is a good 
accounting metric for operators’ profits is also used in the estimation. EBITDA index is also 
taken from Ovum as stated by operators in the period financial results and it is used in this 
paper as a proxy for profits. It is generally calculated as the difference between total revenues 
and operating expenses, excluding portions arising through tax, interest payment, depreciation 
and amortization of assets (Ovum, 2016). As operating expenses include some or all of these 
items, their totals are added back to the difference between total revenues and operating 
expenses to obtain EBITDA. This index is treated the same way as capital expenditure. 
 
3.1.3 Market structure 
Ovum provides data on the number of mobile network operators in each country and the total 
number of subscribers per operator. This two metrics are used to compute market shares, as 
well as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares of market 
shares. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a measure of market concentration and it is used most 
used as a proxy for market structure.  Number of mobile operators in each country is used as 
an alternative measure of market structure. 
 
3.1.4 Regulatory Variable 
This paper uses regulator experience as a proxy for mobile telecommunications regulation. 
Information on when an independent regulator was introduced is obtained from ITU and time 
lapse in years since the regulator was introduced calculated. ITU reports only the year the 
regulator was introduced, thus the value is held constant for all quarters in a year. 
 
3.1.5 Other Variables 
Finally, GDP Per capita based on purchasing power parity information is collected from IMF 
to proxy market demand and population to proxy market size of each country is obtained from 
Ovum.  Ovum primary source of population information is United Nations. For comparability 
all monetary values are given in US dollars based in purchasing power parity.  This is achieved 
by dividing the market exchange rate monetary values with purchasing power parity conversion 
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factors based on the 2011 ICP round for specific countries obtained from World Bank.  The 
ratio is the number of units of a country's currency required to buy the same amount of goods 
and services in the domestic market as a US dollar would buy in the United States (World Bank, 
2015)3. It makes it possible to compare the cost of the bundle of goods that make up gross 
domestic product (GDP) across countries. The final dataset comprises fifteen emerging 
countries and includes 600 observations for the period Q1 2006-Q4 2015. The 15 emerging 
countries include: Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and Ukraine. 
3.1.6 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 below reports summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the period 
Q1 2006-Q42015. The average number of mobile operators during this period is 4.6 which is 
higher compared to OECD average of 3.6 reported by Genakos, Valletti and Verboven (2015) 
for the period 2006-2014. Across the markets, the number operators range between two and 
nine operators. Countries with five or less competitors account for 52.8% of the total 
observations. The average years of independence regulator is 10 years with some periods 
having zero years of independent regulator while other periods having as high as 25 years. The 
average effective price per minute is $0.13, with a standard deviation $0.11 and prices varying 
between $0.07 and $0.57. Capital expenditure per subscriber which is the proxy for investment 
has a quarterly average of $13.94 with values ranging between $1.27 and $82.49 million and 
standard deviation of $11.36 million. This reflects variations across countries and over time. 
 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) per subscriber mean 
is $31.10 on quarterly basis with standard deviation of $11.36 and values ranging from $1.27 
to $82.49.  The monthly average revenue per user (ARPU) values range from $4.77 to $81.42 
with a mean of $23.81 and a standard deviation of $11.66.As indicated earlier, these values 
reflect considerable variations across countries and over time. GDP per Capita which is a 
control variable has an average of $15,763 with a standard deviation of $7,269 with values 
lying between $3,821 and $31,558.The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) values range 
between 0.12 and 0.63 with a mean of 0.35 and standard deviation of 0.10.  
 
 
                                                          
3 According to World Bank, the ratio of purchasing power parity conversion factor to market exchange rate is 
the result obtained by dividing the power parity conversion factor by the market exchange rate. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean STD Min. Max. 
Num. of Operators (Nct) 600 4.632 1.7496 2 9 
Regulator Experience 
(Regxpct) 
600 9.973 6.348 0 25 
Mobile Price (Pct) 600 0.130 0.110 0.007 0.568 
Capital Expenditure per 
Subscriber (Cpxct) 
600 13.943 11.361 1.270 82.491 
EBITDA per Subscriber 
(EBITDAct) 
600 31.069 16.690 4.951 141.367 
ARPUct 600 23.81 11.66 4.77 81.42 
GDP per capita (GDPPCct) 600 15762 7268 3821 31558 
HHIct 600 0.346 0.102 0.122 0.630 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum, ITU, World Bank and IMF datasets. 
3.2 Mobile Telecommunications Market Trend 
As shown in Figure 1, the average mobile service prices per minute for all the countries in this 
study have experienced a downward trend between Q1-2006 and Q4-2015. Overall, the average 
price declined by 84.7% during the period under consideration. This fall in mobile prices could 
be explained by increase in competition in the industry over time, increase in technological 
innovations as well as protection of consumers and smaller operators by regulators in terms of 
regulation of termination rates.  
Figure 1: Mobile Services Average Price Trend, Q12006-Q42015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum and World Bank datasets. 
Notes: Average effective price per minute is calculated by taking the summation of the average price 





















































































As shown on Figure 2, the average revenue per user (ARPU) also indicates a decline of around 
61.4% between Q1-2006 and Q4-2015. The decline could be explained by increasing number 
of subscribers in emerging markets where there is still room for expansion and increased 
demand for mobile services. 
Figure 2: Average Monthly Price per User (ARPU) Trend, Q12006-Q42015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum and World Bank datasets. 
Notes: Average monthly ARPU is calculated by taking the summation of the average operator ARPU 
in each country PPP-adjusted.  
 
As average prices and ARPUs decline, average Capital expenditure (CAPEX) for all the 
country under consideration in this paper has experienced an increasing trend with seasonal 
peaks in the last quarter of each year. Between Q1-2006 and Q4-2015, average CAPEX grew 
by around 148% with an average compounded annual growth rate of 2.4% per quarter. 
Investment in telecommunications sector has increased as a result as expansion and rolling out 
new networks 3G and 4G networks. In emerging economies, penetration rates are still low 
hence there have been massive investments to tap the unpenetrated areas. However, as shown 
in Figure 3, the average capital expenditure per subscriber has declined modestly although the 
trend seems to change in the past few years. For instance, average capital expenditure per 
subscriber decline by an average compounded annual growth rate of 0.8% per quarter to 
register a total decline of 27% between Q12006 and Q42015.  The decline can be explained by 














































































Figure 3: Average Capital Expenditure per Subscriber Trend, Q12006-Q42005 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum and World Bank datasets. 
Notes: Average Capex is calculated weighing the capex for an operator by its market share to 
estimate for the missing capex information and estimating the country total capex and calculating 
the average for all the countries under review. 
 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) also registered a 
compounded annual growth rate of 1.0% to register an overall price increase of 52% for the 
period between Q12006 and Q42015. The earnings growth is majorly driven by data revenue 
in Africa and Asia complemented by subscription growth. For instance, in 2015, data revenue 
accounted for more than 10% of recurring revenues in many countries in Africa, and more than 
a third of revenues in more advanced countries such as South Africa (GSMA, 2015). The other 
drivers of profits included value addition services as well as mobile money as penetration of 
smart phones has enabled mobile based services. However, same as the average capital 
expenditure per subscriber, the average EBITDA per subscriber declined by an average 
compounded annual growth rate of 3.0 per quarter to register a total decline of 69% between 











































































Figure 4: Average Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) per Subscriber Trend, Q12006-Q42015
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum and World Bank datasets. 
Notes: Average EBITDA is calculated weighing the EBITDA for operators by their market shares 
to estimate for the missing capex information and estimating the country total EBITDA and 
calculating the average for all the countries under review. 
 
As illustrated by the trends, there has been considerable changes in the main variables such as 
mobile prices and capital expenditure per subscriber. The variations cut across countries and 
over time as indicated in summary statistics Table 1. This provides the necessary information 
to study the impact of market structure on prices and investments. Nevertheless, this discussion 
also indicates that caution should be taken in accounting for general trends and fluctuations, as 
the interest is in identifying the impact of market structure over and above any historical trends, 
which is discussed in the next section.  
 
Mobile communications industry is characterized by a few number of firms compared with 
other industries such as manufacturing. The industry also portrays characteristics of oligopoly. 
For instance, in oligopolistic markets, there are few number of firms selling identical products 
to large number of consumers and there is barrier to entry (Sorenson, 2002). In mobile 
communication industry, there are few number of mobile operators providing mobile 
services to large of subscribers. Licensing creates a barrier to entry in the market hence 
the market fits in oligopolistic market definition (Valletti, 2003).  The oligopolistic nature 
of mobile communication markets can create a problem of imperfect competition as few 











































































operators and market shares of the two largest operators using data for fifteen emerging 
countries for selected periods. 
Table 2: Number of Competitors and Market Shares 
 Q4 2006 Q4 2009 Q4 2012 Q4 2015 
Av. number of mobile operators 4.27 4.80 4.53 4.67 
Markets with 2 competitors 1 0 0 0 
Markets with 3 competitors 7 5 5 5 
Markets with 4 competitors 1 4 4 3 
Markets with 5 competitors 2 1 1 3 
Markets with 6 competitors 1 1 2 1 
Markets with 7 competitors 3 2 3 2 
Markets with 8 competitors 0 2 0 0 
Markets with 9 competitors 0 0 0 1 
Av. market share of the 2 
largest competitors 
80.8% 76.0% 73.2% 71.2% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum dataset. 
Notes: The average number is for all fifteen countries used in this paper. The Average market share 
for the two largest operators is calculated by taking the summation of the market shares of the two 
largest operators for selected period and finding the average for all the countries. 
 
For the selected period in Table 2 above, the average number of mobile operators range 
between 4.27 and 4.80. Majority of the countries have between 3 and 7 operators for the 
selected quarters with only one country in the last quarter of 2006 having 2 operators and one 
country in the last quarter of 2015 having 9 operators. Generally, the number of mobile 
operators and competitors has not changed much over time. The average market shares for the 
two largest mobile operators has dropped by 9.6% from 80.8% to 71.2% between the last 
quarter of 2006 and the last quarter of 2015. 
 
Table 3 gives a more specific information of the number of mobile operators in specific 
countries used in this study. It gives the number of the operators in each country in the last 
quarter of each year from 2006 to 2015. The changes in the number of operators is either by 
entry of the operator or exit mainly through mergers and acquisition. Generally, there has not 




























Brazil 7 7 8 8 8 7 7 8 9 9 
Bulgaria 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 
China 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Czech Republic 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Egypt 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Greece 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Indonesia 7 8 8 8 8 7 7 8 7 7 
Malaysia 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mexico 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
Pakistan 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Poland 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
South Africa 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Thailand 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Ukraine 5 8 8 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum dataset. 
  
Brazil had seven mobile operators by end of 2006 with Vivo, Tim Brazil and Claro Brazil 
dominating the market. Unicel Brazil entered the market in the third quarter of the 2008 and 
exited in the first quarter of 2011 after the regulator revoked its license for holding two 
operating licenses in the same geographical area (TeleGeography, 2013.).4 On-Telecom and 
Sky Brazil entered the market in quarter one 2013 and quarter one 2014 and by the last quarter 
of 2015, Brazil telecommunications market had nine mobile operators still dominated by Vivo, 
Tim Brazil and Claro Brazil. On the other hand, Bulgaria has had three operators since 2006 
with Max Telecom and Bulsatcom entering the market in the second and third quarter of 2015 
respectively to make it five with the three incumbent operators having market shares between 
27% and 38%. 
 
China Mobile has dominated the three-operator Chinese market since 2006 with market shares 
of over 60%. Chinese has had strict telecommunications market entry regulations hence it has 
not experienced any entry for the period under review. In the case of Czech Republic, Skylink 
Czech Republic exited Czech Republic mobile telecommunications market in third quarter of 
2006 to close the year with three operators with O2 and T-Mobile leading the market with 
                                                          
4 The Brazilian telecommunications regulator Agencia Nacional de Telecomunicacoes (Anatel) prohibits 
telecommucation operators from holding two operating licences for the same geographic area 
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market shares of 39.9% and 38.5% respectively. Mobilkom entered the market in the second 
quarter of 2007 and since then there has not been any entry or exit. The entry of Etisalat Misr 
in the Egyptian telecommunications market in the second quarter of 2007 intensified the 
competition in originally two-operator market. Etisalat Misr has since its entry in 2007 
increased its market share to 24% in 2015.5 
 
Greece mobile telecommunications market has had three operators since the second quarter of 
2007 after Q-Telecom was acquired by WIND Hellas (TeleGeography, 2006). Hungarian three 
mobile operators have maintained their positions in the market with small changes in market 
shares with T-Mobile dominating the market with 45% market share by end of 2015. Unlike 
Greece and Hungary, Indonesia has experienced a lot of activities in its mobile industry. 3 
Indonesia entered the market in the last quarter of 2006 which brought the number of operators 
to seven. Smart Telecom Indonesia which entered the market in the third quarter of 2007 
merged with Mobile-8 in the last quarter of 2010 to form Smartfren (TeleGeography, 2010). 
In the last quarter of 2013, Natrindo Telepon Seluler was acquired by XL Axiata and PT 
Internux entered the market the same period. Even with the seven operators in by end 2015, 
Telkomsel dominated the market with a market share of over 45%. 
 
U-Mobile entered Malaysian telecommunications market in the first quarter 2008 to make the 
number of operators in the market four. Since then, U-Mobile has been able to compete 
effectively with the incumbent operators to close 2015 with a market share of 15% with the 
incumbents closing with markets shares between 27% and 30%. Mexican mobile 
telecommunications market has experienced an exit and an acquisition between 2006 and 2015. 
SPC exited the market in the second quarter of 2007 and Nextel Mexico was acquired by AT 
& T in the first quarter of 2015 to close with three operators in 2015 (TeleGeography, 2015). 
SCO entered Pakistan mobile telecommunications market in the third quarter of 2006 to close 
the year with seven operators. In the first quarter of 2010, the Pakistan telecommunications 
regulator terminated Pakcom license for failure to pay for its renewal in 2008 (TeleGeography, 
2008). 
 
                                                          
5 ECMS and Vodacom shared the market equally before the entry of Etisalat Misr. Etisalat Misr has been able to 




Poland had three competing mobile operators until the first quarter of 2007 when P4 entered 
the market. By end of 2015, there was four operators with market shares ranging between 20% 
and 28%. On the other hand, South Africa had two entries between 2006 and 2015. In the last 
quarter of 2008, competition increased in South African mobile telecommunications market, 
with fixed-line operator Telkom launching its own cellular offering.6 Competition continued 
to increase after the entry of Neotel in the third quarter of 2009. Hutchison-CAT exited 
Malaysian mobile telecommunications market in the first quarter of 2013 to make the number 
of operators five dominated by AIS with a market share of 45% by end of 2015. In Ukraine, 
Telesystems, Intertelecom and Ukrtelecom entered the market in 2007 to make the number of 
operators eight by end of 2007. In its effort to maintain its market share, Kyivstar acquired 
Beeline and Ukraine Radio Systems in 2009 and 2010 respectively to close 2015 with 43% 
market share (TeleGeography, 2010). 
 
Figure 5 below shows that mobile telecommunication markets in emerging economies are 
getting less concentrated over time. Between 2006 and 2015, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
declined on average by about 15%. 
Figure 5: Average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum dataset. 
Notes: Average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated by getting the average index for all 
countries. 
                                                          
6 In the 1990s, South Africa started its mobile telecommunications service provisions through a partnership 
between Telkom and Vodafone which grew to be Vodacom. Telkom pulled out of the partnership in 2008 in 

























































4. Empirical Framework 
To analyse the effect of market structure on mobile prices in mobile telecommunications 
industry, the following equation is estimated: 
lnPct = αc + αt + β1MSct + β2CVct+ εct.                                                               (1) 
The dependent variable (lnPct) in equation (1) is the logarithm of effective price per minute in 
US dollars based on purchasing power parity paid by customers in country c in quarter t. To 
control for global trends and for time-invariant usage-operator-country characteristics, country 
fixed effects (αc) and time fixed effects (αt) respectively are used. MSct, which is the main 
variable indicates the market structure for country c in quarter t.  Two alternative measure of 
market structure are used in the estimation. First, the number of competitors in country c in 
quarter t is used. Secondly, the measure of market concentration, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) is used as an alternative measure of market structure. 
 
The term CVct includes several control variables that may influence prices and vary across 
markets. For instance, log of GDP per capita and log of population are included to capture 
market demand and market size respectively. Market regulation is captured by the number of 
years the market has experienced an independent regulator. εct is the error term which captures 
the effect of other variables on price which are not captured in the equation. 
The next step is to look at the effect of market structure on investment. For the analysis of the 
mobile telecommunication market investment, the following general equation is estimated: 
lnCpxct = αc + αt + β1MSct + β2CVct+ εct                                                         (2) 
The dependent variable (lnCpxct) is the logarithm of average capital expenditure per subscriber 
in country c in quarter t. Country fixed effects (αc) and time fixed effects (αt) are included in 
the equation to account for systematic differences between countries and general trends 
especially seasonal effects respectively. As explained in price estimation equation, MSct 
captures the market structure for country c in quarter t and number of competitors and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) will be alternatively used. The squared values of HHI will 
also be included in the equation to test for quadratic relationship between market concentration 
and investment. CVct includes several control variables that may influence operator investment 
and vary across operators or countries. Log of GDP per capita, log of population and year of 
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independent regulator experience are included as control variables. εct is the normally 
distributed error term. 
 
Logarithm of effective price per minute in US dollars based on purchasing power parity in 
equation (1) is replaced with alternative measures of performance of interest, which include 
logarithm of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) per 
subscriber and logarithm average revenue per user (ARPU).  
 
The key empirical challenge faced in empirical studies like this is potential endogeneity of the 
number of operators and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). However, in mobile 
telecommunications industry, market entry is determined by the decision of the regulator and 
does not depend on market characteristics such as high prices and return on investment as in 
the case of markets with free entry (see Sarkar et al., 1999; Bijwaard et al., 2008; Fernández & 
Usero, 2009; Genakos, Valletti and Verboven, 2015). This is also supported by Hauge & 
Jamison, (2009) arguments that in mobile telecommunication industry, there are legal barriers 
to entry such as licencing, economic barriers such as high fixed costs as well as strategic 
barriers such as customer lock-in and high switching costs induced by the incumbent operators. 
 
Eggers et al. (2011) test the assumption exogenously determined market entry in mobile 
telecommunications. More specifically, they test whether there is any significant difference in 
efficiency between entrants who acquired their network operation license through a clear 
awarding process and entrants who acquired their license through unclear means such as 
allotment of the national government. Their basic assumption in this test is that a more 
transparent the awarding process will lead to the most efficient operator obtaining the network 
operation license. They find that there is no statistically significant differences between early 
and late movers in the market depending on the license awarding process hence they interpret 
this as an evidence for the exogeneity of market entry in mobile telecommunications. Hence, 
in this paper the number of operators and HHI are assumed to be exogenous in mobile 
telecommunications sector. This is also evident from Figure 6 below which shows that the 
average HHI is not moving as much as average prices change for the fifteen countries used in 
this study This could be explained by the fact that in the mobile telecommunications industry, 
people may not be able to respond to periodical changes because of switching costs, which 
supports the conclusion in Eggers et al. (2011). 
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Figure 6: Relationship between Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Mobile Prices 
 






This section presents results for effects of market structure on average market mobile price and 
investment as well as results for the alternative measures of performance discussed above. First, 
the price regressions are presented and discussed followed by investment results and finally 
the results for alternative measures of performance are presented. 
 
5.1 Price Regressions Results 
Table 3 shows the results from estimation the price equations using country level data for the 
period between Q1 2006 and Q4 2015. In the first estimation, market structure is approximated 
by the number of firms which turns out to be negative but insignificant. The theoretical 
derivation above suggests that there should be negative dependence between the number of 
firms and price, a result which was confirmed in Genakos, Valletti and Verboven (2015) for 
OECD countries.  In the second estimation, market structure is approximated by the HHI index. 
As discussed earlier, due to regulated entry and character of mobile industry, the HHI is 
considered to be exogenous. Results show that an increase in the HHI has a positive and 
significant impact on average market mobile prices. These results are in line with results by 
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The rest of the control variables in Table 3 are as follows; income levels proxied by GDP per 
capita do not have any significant effect on average market mobile prices when number of 
operators are used to proxy market structure. However, when the HHI is used, results indicate 
that higher income levels have positive and significant impact on mobile average market 
mobile prices. Results also indicate that larger markets have higher mobile average market 
mobile prices. Nevertheless, regulator experience has a negative and significant effect in 
mobile prices. Regulators tend to regulate average prices as a measure to protect consumers 
and smaller operators. Lastly, the time trend variable indicates that mobile prices have declined 
over time.  
 
Table 3: The Effect of Market Structure on Average market mobile price 
 (1) (2) 
Estimation method FE FE 
Dependent Variable lnPct lnPct 




Number of Mobile Operators -0.0360 
(0.0226) 
 
HHI  3.9463*** 
(0.5116) 




















Observations 600 600 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.7993 0.8172 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum, ITU, World Bank and IMF datasets. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average market effective price per minute 
paid by consumers adjusted for PPP. The standard errors are given in parenthesis below 





5.2 Investment Regressions Results 
Table 4 presents the results from estimation the investment equations for alternative measures 
of market structure. Same as the price analysis, these results are based on the sample of all 
countries in this study for the period between quarter one 2006 and quarter four 2015. In the 
first estimation, the number of firms does not have significant impact on investment. In the 
second estimation, market structure is approximated by the HHI index as a quadratic 
specification.  Since the linear term has a significant and positive impact and the quadratic term 
has a significant negative impact, it can be concluded that there is an inverted-U relationship 
between market structure proxied by the HHI and investment proxied by capital expenditure 
per subscriber in mobile communication industry in emerging markets. This result is in line 
with findings reported in HSBC (2015). 
 
The control variables show that countries with lower incomes have higher capital expenditure 
per subscriber. For instance, investment significantly increases with the increase in GDP per 
capita when the HHI is used to proxy market structure. This is mainly because the population 
most emerging markets is high and still growing. Results also indicate that regulator experience 
has a positive and significant effect on capital expenditure per subscriber. Moreover, capital 
expenditure per subscriber has been decreasing over time as indicated by the time trend variable 
which signals the effect of the increasing population and mobile subscriber base in emerging 
economies. Quarterly seasonal effects are found to exist where investments are found to be 
















Table 4: The Effect of Market Structure on Investment 
 (1) (2) 
Estimation method FE FE 
Dependent Variable lnCpxct lnCpxct 




Number of Mobile Operators -0.0116 
(0.0468) 
 
HHI  22.866***  
(3.3573) 
HH12  -18.085***  
(4.1411) 
































Observations 600 600 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.2664 0.3686 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum, ITU, World Bank and IMF datasets. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the market capital expenditure per subscriber 
adjusted for PPP. The P-values are given in parenthesis below coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
Table 5 below gives results for additional price and investment estimations. The estimations 
are aimed to determine the behaviour of variable when restricted number of countries are used 
and the results compared to the results for all countries in this study. In this case, the sample is 
restricted to emerging economies in Africa and Asia only. One disadvantage of this restriction 
is that it makes sample less representative. Generally, results indicate that there is high 
27 
 
correlation between the results for the whole sample and the results for emerging economies in 
Africa and Asia only. 
 
Column (1) in Table 5 below gives results that have been already presented in column (3) of 
Table 3. Column (2) shows the effect of the HHI on prices for markets in Africa and Asia only. 
As indicated, the HHI also has a positive and significant effect on mobile prices in African and 
Asian mobile telecommunication markets. Furthermore, the magnitude is higher for the 
restricted sample compared with the whole sample. Same as the market concentration, the 
effect of market power proxied by GDP per capita on mobile prices is higher in the restricted 
sample than the whole sample. Additionally, mobile prices are found to have higher sensitivity 
to market size in African and Asian markets compared with markets for the whole sample. 
Likewise, independence regulators weigh more on mobile prices in African and Asian markets 
compared to when the whole sample is used. However, on average African and Asian mobile 
telecommunications markets are found to have less years of independent regulator experience 
compared with the markets in other regions. Lastly, prices have significantly reduces over time 
in both samples with higher reduction in the restricted sample. 
 
Column (3) and (4) in Table 5 gives investment results for the whole and restricted sample 
respectively. Just as it has been done with mobile price estimates, the model is restricted to 
emerging economies in Africa and Asia only. Column (3) gives results that have been already 
presented in column (3) of Table 4 and Column (4) gives the results for the restricted sample. 
As indicated earlier, there is a quadratic relationship between market concentration and mobile 
telecommunication market investment proxied by capital expenditure per subscriber. When the 
sample is restricted to African and Asian markets, this relation still exists. Results also indicate 
that market power has higher effect in the restricted sample. Market size has been found to 
reduce capital expenditure per subscriber with higher effect in African and Asian markets. This 
is majorly because emerging economies in Africa and Asia have higher population and 
population growth rates relative to the investment in mobile telecommunications industry 
compared with their counterparts in other parts of the world.  Regulation has been found to 
have a positive impact on investment where the impact is higher in the restricted sample. 
 
Capital expenditure per subscriber has been found to decrease over time with a higher 
magnitude for African and Asian markets compared with the whole sample. This decline can 
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be attributed to high populations and population growth rates in African and Asian countries 
which translates to higher mobile subscription rates leading to increasing subscriber base. 
Quarterly seasonal effects were found to exist with investment increasing from quarter one to 
quarter four with peaks in quarter four for both samples. However, although investment in 
quarter two was higher for the restricted sample compared with whole sample relative to 
quarter one, this is reversed in quarter four where restricted sample indicates lower investment 
compared to the whole sample. 
Table 5: Additional Price and investment Estimations Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation method FE FE FE FE 
Dependent Variable lnPct lnPct lnCpxct lnCpxct 
Countries All Africa & 
Asia only 
All Africa & 
Asia only 










































































Observations 600 320 600 320 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.8172 0.7967 0.3686 0.5286 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum, ITU, World Bank and IMF datasets. 
Notes: The dependent variables are the logarithms of the average market effective price per minute 
paid by consumers and the market capital expenditure per subscriber adjusted for PPP. The 
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standard errors are given in parenthesis below coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
5.3 Other Measures of Performance Regressions Results 
Table 5 presents the results from estimation the other measures of performance equations for 
alternative measures of market structure. Same as the previous regressions, these results are 
based on the sample of all countries in this study for the period between Q1 2006 and Q4 2015. 
Results indicate that the number of mobile operators does not have any significant effect on 
market profits proxied by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) per subscriber. However, markets profits increase with increase in market 
concentration. In the case of revenues, results indicate that an increase in the number of mobile 
operators has a negative and statistically significant effect on market revenue proxied by 
average revenue per user (ARPU). Moreover, high concentrated markets have significantly 
higher revenues. 
 
Specifically, column (1) in indicate that number of competitors does not have any significant 
effect on mobile telecommunications market profits proxied by EBITDA per subscriber. 
Columns (3) presents market profit proxied by EBITDA per subscriber results based on the 
HHI as a proxy for the market structure which indicates that market concentration has a positive 
impact on market profits. This results are in line with results by Genakos, Valletti and Verboven 
(2015) for OECD countries for the period between 2006 and 2014. A possible explanation for 
these results is that operators in high concentration markets have some degree of monopoly 
with limited competition and experience a more inelastic demand hence they are likely to 
influence the market outcomes for instance by increasing or maintaining high prices which in 
turn increases their profits. The control variables show that countries’ income levels and market 
size have a statistically significant positive impact on market profits. On the other hand, market 
profits have been declining over time and with the independent regulator experience. Market 
profits are found to peak in quarter three relative to quarter one. There is no significant seasonal 
effect on market profits in quarter four profits relative to quarter one. 
 
Unlike profits, an extra competitor has a negative and significantly effect on market revenues 
proxied by ARPU as shown in column (2). However, an increase in the HHI significantly 
increases market revenues. Again these results similar to results by Genakos, Valletti and 
Verboven (2015). This could be explained by the same explanation given for profits. On the 
other variables, market with high levels of income have higher revenues and there is an inverse 
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relationship between market size proxied by population and market revenues proxied by 
ARPU. This is to say that large markets have lower revenue per subscriber as revenues have to 
be distributed over a large number of subscribers. Number of years the market has had an 
independent regulator does not a significant effect on revenues and ARPU has declined over 
time.  
Table 6: The Effect of Market Structure on Other Measures of Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation method FE FE FE FE 
Dependent Variable lnEBITDAct lnARPUct  lnEBITDAct lnARPUct 










































































Observations 600 600 600 600 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.6316 0.7301 0.6996 0.7546   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum, ITU, World Bank and IMF datasets. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithms of the market EBITDA per subscriber and ARPU 
adjusted for PPP. The P-values are given in parenthesis below coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate 





In general, the number of operators in emerging economies telecommunications markets has 
not changed much and it was found to have insignificant effect on both market mobile prices 
and investment per subscriber. However, due to the current wave of market consolidations, the 
number of operators is likely to reduce hence influencing mobile prices upward. This mobile 
consolidation trend is also likely to lead to increase in market concentration which has been 
reducing slowly over the period under review. Since market concentrations is found to be 
positively correlated with mobile prices, the increase in mobile concentration is likely to further 
drive prices up. However, this is likely to increase profits and revenues. 
On the other hand, market concentration has been found to have a quadratic relationship with 
investment proxied by investment per subscriber. Figure 7 below shows the inverted-U 
relationship between market concentration and investment. The investment values are given 
relative to when market concentration is zero meaning there is perfect competition. 
Figure 7: Relationship between Investment and Market Concentration
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum, World Bank datasets. 
Although the number of operators is found to have insignificant effect on investment, the 
optimum level of investment is found at levels of the HHI between 0.6 and 0.7. This means 
that countries should strive to achieve such levels of market concentration. With the average 
HHI for the countries in this study being around 0.35, the regulators should strive to achieve 
higher market concentration levels in order to achieve optimum investment. However, this is 
likely to increase mobile prices since market concentration is found to have a positively 











































































































































static and dynamic efficiencies in that as much as the regulators try to achieve the short-run 
efficient allocation of resources and minimise marginal costs of providing mobile services, the 
long-run progress is also be taken into account. This can be achieved by encouraging 
development of better technologies through research and innovation to improve efficiency of 
mobile service provision over time.  
 
5.4 South African Mobile Telecommunications Market Case 
This section discusses in details how South African mobile telecommunication market 
compares with the markets in the other countries in this study and the implications of findings 
of this study to the South African mobile telecommunications market. South Africa is chosen 
because of the availability of data for most of the variables. However, there is missing data on 
some variables especially for smaller mobile operators. South Africa has one of the most 
advanced telecommunication sector in Africa in terms of technology deployed and services 
provided. However, the industry growth has started to slow down after relishing years of robust 
growth and health profits. The industry is experiencing slower growth, lower mobile 
termination rates and price competition which has created the need for cost-cutting and 
consolidations which are set to transform the landscape of South African mobile 
telecommunications sector. The key regulatory matters currently shaping the market include 
the unbundling of the local loop and the reduction of interconnection rates, the licensing of 
WiMAX and LTE spectrum and digital dividend spectrum, and issues to do with market 
consolidation such as mergers and acquisitions. 
 
South Africa has one of the highest mobile penetration rates among the emerging economies 
which increased from 66% in 2006 to 169% in by the end of 2015 (growth rate of 156%) as 
compared with an average penetration of 103% for the emerging economies under review by 
2015. In this virtually saturated voice market, mobile networks operators are now competing 









Figure 7: South Africa Mobile Penetration Rates 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum dataset. 
As indicated in Table 3, competition increased in South African mobile telecommunications 
market, after a fixed-line operator, Telkom launched its own cellular offering 2008 followed 
by the entry of Neotel in the third quarter of 2009 to make the total number of operators five. 
Together with MTN and Cell C, these two entries have effectively reduced the market share of 
the market leader, Vodacom, from 58% in 2006 to about 40% in 2015. The top gainer in the 
market is Cell C which has experienced the highest growth of the market share within the 
period of under review with Telkom also experience a positive growth. One of the main 
explanation for this could be because of the decision by South African telecoms regulator, the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) legislation to offer 
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Figure 7: South Africa Mobile Operator Market Shares
     
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum dataset. 
Even with losing the market share to its competitors, Vodacom stills remains the leader of the 
market followed by MTN. Both Vodacom and MTN had a combined market share of 91% in 
2006 which reduced to 74% by the end of 2015. The top gainer, Cell C, increased market share 
from less than 10% in 2006 to 23% by end of 2015. 
 
South Africa mobile telecommunications market is one of the least concentrated markets 
among the emerging economies with Herfindahl-Hirschman index lower that the average of all 
the emerging economies under review as shown in figure 8 below.  








































































































SA HHI All Countries Average HHI
35 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum and World Bank datasets. 
 
Besides low market concentration, South Africa has one of the highest end user mobile prices 
among the emerging economies under review. As shown in figure 9, South Africa average 
mobile prices are higher than the average for all countries in this study. However, the prices 
have experienced a downward trend partly because of the increased competition due to Telkom 
and Neotel entry into the market as well as regulator intervention to protect consumers and 
smaller operators. 
 
Figure 9: South Africa Mobile Prices 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum and World Bank datasets. 
Notes: Average effective price per minute is calculated by taking the summation of the average price 
paid by consumers for each operator in each country PPP-adjusted.  
 
Even with one of the highest mobile penetration rates and mobile prices, South Africa has 
experienced lower capital expenditure per subscriber compared with the other emerging 
economies in this study as shown in figure 10. This could be partly explained by the fact that 
South Africa regulates foreign participation and ownership in telecommunications sector 
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Figure 10: South Africa Capital Expenditure per Subscriber
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ovum and World Bank datasets. 
Notes: Average Capex is calculated weighing the capex for an operator by its market share to 
estimate for the missing capex information and estimating the country total capex and dividing with 
subscriber base then calculating the average for all the countries under review. 
 
From the findings of this study, it can be concluded that the South African mobile 
telecommunications market prices are likely to decline in a reduced rate, flatten or even rise 
given the rising market concentration. As indicated earlier, this could be fueled by ongoing 
market consolidations. Investment per subscriber is way below the optimum investment given 
the level of the market concentration. However, the trend seems to gain momentum as both the 
market concentration and the investment per subscriber have experienced a positive growth in 




This paper has analysed the impact of market structure on prices and investments in the mobile 
telecommunications industry. An empirical study has been contacted using a panel of fifteen 
emerging economies across four continents over the period 2006-2015. Detailed operator level 
information has been collected and aggregated to market level. The analysis has been done at 
country level. 
 
Market concentration is found to have positive impact on mobile prices and a quadratic 
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subscriber relative to when there is perfect competition is found to be at market concentration 
levels of between 0.6 and 0.7.These results indicate that there is a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency. Competition in mobile telecommunications reduces prices but also results 
in lower investments as compared to more concentrated markets. Market concentration is also 
found to have positive relationship with Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) per subscriber and average revenue per user (ARPU). Seasonal effects 
exist in investment and EBITDA where investment is found to peak in quarter four and 
EBITDA is found to be significantly higher in third quarter relative to the first quarter. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper which analyses the impact of market 
structure on both prices and investments for emerging economies. The findings of this paper 
are therefore an important addition to the literature on market structure and market outcomes 
in mobile telecommunications and are useful to competition authorities as well. An open 
question that the study raises, but cannot answer due to data limitations, is an assessment of 
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